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Abstract 
 
The study examines how the service production of primary physicians in Norway is 
influenced by changes in fees. The data represent about 2 650 fee-for-service 
physicians for the years 1995-2000. We constructed a variable that made it possible 
to estimate income effects of fee changes on service levels. Service production was 
measured by the number of consultations per physician, the number of laboratory 
tests per consultation, and the proportion of consultations lasting more than 20 
minutes. Our main finding is that fee changes have no income effect on service 
production. Our results imply that fee regulation can be an effective means of 
controlling physicians’ income, and therefore government expenditure on primary 
physician services. 
 
Key words: Primary physicians, consultations, fees, income effect. 
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Introduction 
 
Fee-for-service remuneration is an important form of remuneration for physicians 
who work in primary health services. An important issue with this type of payment 
system is whether regulation of fee-for-service payments is an effective means of 
controlling physicians’ income and government expenditure. If physicians respond 
to a reduction in remuneration per item of treatment by a corresponding increase in 
the amount of treatment provided, then the authorities do not achieve any saving. 
 
A reduction in remuneration per item of treatment has two effects. The substitution 
effect pulls in the direction of lower treatment volume because treatment of patients 
becomes less remunerative relative to other activities. The income effect pulls in the 
direction of higher treatment volume because the physician tries to compensate for 
the loss of remuneration. Purely on a theoretical basis, one cannot say which effect 
will be dominant. Thus to what extent physicians react to a reduction in 
remuneration per item of treatment by increasing or reducing the amount of 
treatment provided, becomes an empirical question. 
 
Many studies have been carried out to investigate the relationship between changes 
in fees and changes in the amount of treatment provided. Most of these studies are 
from the USA, and were carried out in the 1980s and early 1990s [1-12]. The results 
of these studies are conflicting. Some of the studies provide evidence for an income 
effect, others do not. Mitchell et al. (2000) have carried out a critical review of these 
early American studies, and they point out that the results are unreliable because of 
methodological weaknesses [13]. The most important weaknesses that they identify 
are that the price variables are unreliable, that important control variables have been 
omitted from the analyses, and that the independent variables have poor validity. 
 
The aim of this study was to estimate the income effect of fee changes on service 
production of primary physicians in Norway. The sample consisted of almost the 
whole population of primary physicians who have fee-for-service remuneration in 
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Norway. Fee adjustments in Norway are determined at the national level and differ 
between the various types of services provided by primary physicians. Changes in 
fees are therefore exogenous to individual physicians, and the impact of changes in 
fees on physician revenues vary between physicians. Each year, some physicians 
benefit from changes in fees, whereas others break even or even have a fall in 
income. We identified the income effect from changes in fees by exploring how the 
service levels of individual physicians were affected by income shocks due to 
changes in the national fee schedule.     
 
Primary physician services constitute an important part of Norwegian health 
services. Norwegian primary physicians have a gate-keeper function, since non-
acute patients require a referral from a primary physician in order to obtain treatment 
from a specialist or at a hospital. About two-thirds of primary physicians have fee-
for-service remuneration, and thus, theoretically, they have the possibility to respond 
to changes in fees. If the income effect is strong, this will make cost control of 
primary physician services difficult. 
 
The next section presents a brief review of recent studies. We then describe the 
institutional framework of our study, the data set and the analytical approach. Finally 
we present the results and offer a discussion. 
 
Brief review of recent studies 
 
Nearly all of the recent studies that have investigated the relationship between 
changes in fees and changes in the amount of treatment provided are from the USA. 
The services that have been studied are specialized health services, such as internal 
medicine, cardiology, ophthalmology, orthopaedic surgery, radiology, gynaecology 
and urology. Mitchell et al. (2000) studied how ophthalmologists and orthopaedic 
surgeons responded to large reductions in Medicare fees for their services in 1994 
[13]. They found a weak negative income effect for the number of cataract 
operations, but a positive income effect for the number of joint procedures. The 
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result for orthopaedic surgeons suggests that a reduction in fees does not lead to a 
compensatory change in behaviour. The study by Mitchell et al. (2000) seems to be 
the first contribution where the income effect is estimated directly, as earlier studies 
considered the total effect of fee changes (the income effect and the substitution 
effect) on supply of services.  
 
The results of two studies indicate that the substitution effect is strong [14, 15]. 
Hadley et al. (2003) found that an increase in Medicare’s fees for breast surgery led 
to a significant increase in the number of operations [14]. Gruber et al. (1999) 
studied the relationship between Medicaid’s fees for caesarean delivery, and the 
number of caesarean deliveries [15]. They also found that an increase in fees led to a 
large increase in the number of caesarean deliveries. However, in an earlier study, 
Keeler and Fok (1996) found that a change in fees had little effect on the number of 
caesarean deliveries [16]. A Canadian study, that included specialists in internal 
medicine and general surgery, also found that changes in fees had only a negligible 
effect on supply of specialized health services [17]. 
 
Nguyen [18] and Nguyen and Derrick [19] studied how a Medicare fee control 
imposed in 1990 influenced the service production of specialists in surgery, 
radiology, internal medicine and pathology. They found a volume response of about 
40 %. Thus a reduction in price of 1 % led to an increase in treatment volume of 
about 0.40 %. Zuckerman et al. [20] found similar results based on data from nearly 
all physicians who received payments from Medicare, but in their study the unit of 
observation was geographic area. These findings suggest a relatively strong income 
effect, which may indicate that it is difficult for Medicare to control costs only by 
freezing fees.  
 
There are few studies that have investigated how changes in fees influence service 
production of physicians in European countries. In a study from Norway, using a 
sample of 44 primary physicians, Carlsen et al. (2003) found that changes in fees had 
little or no effect on four types of laboratory tests [21]. However, the sample in that 
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study was small, so the results should be interpreted with caution. The study 
presented here is a continuation of the study of Carlsen et al. (2003) using a much 
larger sample of fee-for-service primary physicians. In addition, we have now also 
included in the analyses most of the services primary physicians provide. 
 
Primary physician services in Norway 
 
In Norway, the municipalities (n=431 in 2006) have responsibility for planning, 
organizing and running primary health services, including primary physician 
services. The Norwegian Government has not defined any legal minimum standards 
with respect to the level of quality of services. Until 1 June 2001 primary physician 
services were mainly provided by two types of physician, both of which worked 
separately from hospital services, and provided the first contact between patients and 
the health services. The two types of primary physician were community physicians 
and contract physicians1. Community physicians, who represented about 19 % of all 
primary physicians, were employed by the municipalities and received a salary [22].  
 
Contract physicians represented about 67 % of all primary physicians [22]. They 
were self-employed, but had a contract with the municipality to cover some of their 
expenses (auxiliary personnel etc). The size of the grant which covered some of the 
expenses of contract physicians was regulated by the “Normal tariff”, an agreement 
which is negotiated annually between the Norwegian Medical Association and the 
Ministry of Government Administration. The fixed local government grant 
contributed about 30 % of the gross income of contract physicians [23].  
 
Contract physicians obtained additional income from patient fees and from payments 
                     
1There are also two other types of primary physician: self-employed physicians and junior physicians. 
Self-employed physicians are independent and have no contract with the municipality. About 7 % of 
all primary physicians are self-employed, and the majority are located in central cities. Junior 
physicians are medical students who have completed their studies, but who are not fully registered. 
They become fully registered after having worked under supervision in a municipality and in a 
hospital for one year. They are mainly located in small municipalities where there are problems to 
recruit community physicians or contract physicians [22]. 
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from the National Insurance Administration. Patient fees contributed about 30 % of 
the gross income of contract physicians [23]. Patients paid a set fee for every 
consultation with the physician, whereas items of treatment were free. Payments 
received from the National Insurance Administration contributed about 40 % of the 
gross income from practice for contract physicians. The major items which incurred 
a payment from the National Insurance Administration were laboratory tests and 
consultations lasting more than 20 minutes [24]. The latter payment is used for 
patients who are time-consuming to treat, and this was introduced so that primary 
physicians should not avoid patient groups with special needs. The level of patient 
fees and the level of payments from the National Insurance Administration were 
regulated by the normal tariff. 
 
Data and Variables  
 
We studied only contract physicians, as community physicians do not receive fees 
for consultations and items of treatment. We used data for the years 1995-2000. 
During this period, there was a significant increase in fees for the most commonly 
used procedures in primary physician services in Norway. A summary is given in 
Table 1. For example, during the whole period, the fees for a consultation increased 
by 32.5 %, with the greatest increase from 1996 to 1997, and from 1997 to 1998. 
The mean increase in fees for laboratory tests was 24.3 % from 1995 to 2000, with 
the greatest increase at the beginning of the period, from 1995 to 1996.  
 
Data about individual physicians were obtained from the National Insurance 
Administration. The National Insurance Administration obtains its data primarily for 
administrative purposes. The data are used to monitor physicians’ activities, 
treatment patterns and level of expenses [25]. The information is collected for one 
month: i.e. the content of all patient consultations during one month is registered on 
data. All contract physicians in Norway have to participate in this registration. For 
each year, the National Insurance Administration makes data from a sample of the 
physicians available for research.  
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Not all the physicians were present in all the six years. However, a relatively large 
number of physicians were present in two consecutive years2. These physicians were 
identified and the independent variable that was used to estimate the income effect 
was constructed in the following way. We calculated the income of each physician 
from all production in year t-1, that is to say from all consultations and items of 
treatment. We then calculated the predicted income in year t, that is, what their 
income would be in year t with the same production as in year t-1, but with fees in 
year t. The difference between these two levels of income can then be interpreted as 
the component of change in total physician income which is due to changes in the 
national fee schedule. Formally, this can be written as: 
                                                                                            J 
  ∆ INCOMEit = [CONSULTATIONSit-1 · FEE t + ∑ ITEMSjit-1 · FEEjt] 
                                                                                           j=1 
                                                                                               J                                                     
                                   - [CONSULTATIONSit-1 · FEE t-1 + ∑ ITEMSjit-1 · FEEjt-1]       
                                                                                              j=1  
where CONSULTATIONSit is the number of consultations in year t for physician i, 
FEE t is the fee for consultations in year t, ITEMSjit is the number of treatments of 
type j provided by physician i in year t, j = 1, J, and FEEjt is the fee for treatment j in 
year t, j = 1, J.  
 
Our main explanatory variable is relative change in income  
(∆ INCOMEit / INCOMEit-1), denoted INCOMERELit. INCOMERELit is physician 
specific because relative fees vary over time and the composition of consultations 
and items of treatment varies across physicians. Moreover, INCOMERELit does not 
depend on CONSULTATIONSit and ITEMSjit, and is therefore exogenous to 
physician responses to fee changes.  
 
We carried out the analyses on the following three services: consultations, laboratory 
                     
2The numbers of physicians who were present in two consecutive years (in brackets) were: 896 (1995 
and 1996), 545 (1996 and 1997), 375 (1997 and 1998), 334 (1998 and 1999) and 513 (1999 and 
2000). These data are representative for the total population of primary physicians in Norway [26]. 
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tests and consultations lasting more than 20 minutes. To simplify the exposition, we 
did not introduce separate symbols for each of these services. Let Yit denote the 
number of consultations provided by physician i in year t, the number of laboratory 
tests per consultation of physician i in year t and the proportion of consultations 
lasting more than 20 minutes of physician i in year t. The following regression model 
was estimated for each of the services: 
 
∆Yit /Yit-1 = αi + αt + β1 INCOMERELit + β2 MUNICIPALITYit + β3Yit-1 + εit.  
 
αi are physician effects included to control for trends in practice style that are 
specific to each physician. Previous research has shown that there are large 
variations in practice profiles for different physicians, and that these variations are 
fairly stable over time [27, 28]. αt are year effects included to take account of events 
that can vary from year to year, but which affect all physicians equally (for example 
epidemics). εit is an identically and independently distributed error term. 
MUNICIPALITYit is a vector of variables at the level of the municipality that can 
have an influence on the service production of physicians. The relative changes from 
t-1 to t were calculated for the following variables: the proportion of the population 6 
years and younger, the proportion of the population 80 years and older, the 
proportion of women, and the number of primary physicians per 10 000 inhabitants. 
 
Preliminary investigations suggested that service levels do not follow a random 
walk; high service levels in one year are typically followed by lower production the 
next year. To handle mean reversion, we included the service level lagged one year, 
Yit-1, as explanatory variable in the regression equations.  
Since both the dependent variable and INCOMEREL are measured in relative terms, 
the regression coefficient β1 can be interpreted directly as an elasticity.  
 
A priori, we cannot rule out the possibility that the effect of income shocks on 
service levels is non-linear. For example, it is possible that only the physicians who 
experience an absolute fall in income compensate by supplying more services. In 
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order to test for non-linearity, we constructed ten dummy variables in which 
observations (an observation is a given physician in a given year) were grouped 
according to the size of relative change in income. This was done by dividing the 
continuous variable that measures relative change in income into 10 parts. 
Observations with physicians who had the smallest relative change in income 
(closest to zero) were used as the reference category; this turned out to be the 10-20 
% fractile. For each of the services, regressions were estimated with the dummy 
variables as regressors instead of relative change in income. 
 
Results 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. The mean values for the key variables are 
reported for each of the 10 sub-samples.  
 
In the whole sample, physician’s mean monthly income from fees was NOK 54 270 
in the baseline year (t-1). In the following year (t), physicians’ mean income had 
increased by NOK 1 383 due to changes in fees, representing an increase of 2.5 %. 
The physicians who were in the lowest 10 % fractile, had a mean reduction in 
income of 0.7 %. The physicians who were in the highest 10 % fractile, had a mean 
increase in income of 6.8 %. 
 
In the whole sample, the mean number of consultations per physician per month in 
the baseline year was 244. This increased to 256 the following year, which 
represents an increase of 4.9 %. There appears to be no clear relationship between 
relative change in income and relative change in number of consultations. For 
example, for the 10 % of physicians who had the greatest reduction in income the 
number of consultations increased by 10 %. For the 10 % of physicians who had the 
greatest increase in income, the number of consultations increased by 7.7 %. The 
main pattern is that the proportion of consultations increased from year t-1 to year t 
for all the ten sub-samples. 
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In the whole sample, the mean number of laboratory tests per consultation in the 
baseline year was 1.05 (Table 2). The mean number of laboratory tests decreased to 
1.03 the following year, which represents a reduction of 1.9 %. For most of the sub-
samples, there was a reduction in the number of laboratory tests. For example, for 
the physicians who had the largest reduction in income, the number of laboratory 
tests per consultation fell from year t-1 to year t by 8.8 %. There was an increase in 
the number of laboratory tests for only three sub-samples (60-70 %, 80-90 %, and 
90-100 % fractiles). Among other things, the number of laboratory tests increased by 
6 % for the 10 % of physicians who had the greatest increase in income due to fee 
changes. 
 
For the whole sample, the mean proportion of consultations lasting more than 20 
minutes was 0.33 in the baseline year. This proportion fell to 0.32 in the following 
year. With the exception of one sub-sample (the 80-90 % fractile), there was a 
reduction in the number of consultations lasting more than 20 minutes from year t-1 
to year t in all the sub-samples. The reduction was greatest for the 30-40 % fractile. 
For this sub-sample, the proportion of consultations lasting more than 20 minutes 
fell by 7.6 % from year t-1 to year t.  
 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression analyses. In this table, the variable that 
measures the relative change in income (INCOMEREL) was included in a 
continuous form. One of the main findings is that relative change in income does not 
have a statistically significant effect on any of the dependent variables at the 
conventional level of significance (p<0.05). 
 
In one specification, the municipality variables have significant effects. The number 
of consultations lasting more than 20 minutes increased when the proportion of 
women increased. In several of the specifications, the dummies for year have 
statistically significant effects. In each equation, the service level lagged one year 
has negative and very significant effects. Hence, service levels are also characterized 
by mean reversion when we controlled for possible determinants of service 
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production. 
  
Table 4 presents the results of the analyses with dummy variables. The control 
variables are the same as in Table 3, but the results for these variables are not 
reported. With one exception, none of the dummy variables had statistically 
significant effects on the dependent variables. The sizes of the regression 
coefficients were also low in absolute values.  
 
As a robustness test, we examined the relationship between absolute changes in 
service levels and absolute changes in income. All the main conclusions remain 
unaltered. The coefficient of the continuous income variable was positive for all 
three dependent variables, and almost all dummy variables remained insignificant, 
thus confirming the absence of compensatory behaviour by physicians. 
 
As a second robustness test, we excluded physician fixed effects from the equations. 
This caused a large drop in the explanatory power of the estimated relationships, as 
physician specific trends in service levels are quantitatively important. However, 
even without physician specific trends, there was hardly any evidence of income 
effects. 
 
Discussion 
 
We found no income effects for the services we studied. As in the study of Mitchell 
et al (2000), we constructed a separate variable that measured the exogenous effect 
of a change in fees on physician revenues [13]. Our findings are consistent with the 
results of Mitchell et al. (2000) for orthopaedic surgeons, the results of Hadley et al. 
for breast surgery, and the results of Gruber et al. for caesarean delivery [14, 15]. 
Our results are also consistent with the findings from an earlier panel data study of 
primary physician services in Norway [21] 
 
The findings are also consistent with the results of other studies of primary physician 
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services in Norway in which cross-sectional data have been used [29-32]. A main 
finding in these studies is that increased competition (more physicians per capita) 
leads to lower physician income. Grytten et al. [31] studied the income effect by 
exploring the relationship between non-practice income and the number of treatment 
items per consultation using a cross-sectional data set, which encompassed nearly 
the whole population of contract physicians in Norway. They found that non-practice 
income had no effect on the number of treatment items per consultation. The results 
from the present study, which employs panel data rather than cross-sectional data, 
support the results from the study of Grytten et al. [31].  
 
Our results imply that regulation of the level of fees can be an effective means of 
controlling the income of primary physicians, and therefore government expenditure 
on primary physician services. When the income effect is equal to nought, a 
reduction in fees will lead to a corresponding reduction in the expenditure of the 
National Insurance Administration, if the substitution effect is also equal to nought. 
Alternatively, if the substitution effect is positive, a change in remuneration per item 
of treatment will lead to a greater reduction in the expenditure of the National 
Insurance Administration on primary physician services. 
 
Our sample included many physicians. However, only about 10 % of physicians 
experienced a negative development in income from year t-1 to the following year t 
(Table 2). It is possible that it is primarily the physicians who experience a great 
reduction in income as a result of changes in fees who respond by increasing their 
service production. This group of physicians is not heavily represented in the 
sample. We should therefore be cautious when drawing conclusions about what may 
happen if physicians experience a substantial fall in income. When interpreting the 
results we should also take into account the fact that the increase in income resulting 
from an increase in fees was relatively moderate for most of the physicians (Table 
2). Therefore the possibility cannot be excluded that we could have observed 
behaviour in the direction of lower service production if the increase in income had 
been larger.  
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Conclusion 
 
We studied the income effect of changes in fees on service production  
using a sample of contract physicians in Norway. We found no income effects for 
the services we studied, which were: number of consultations per physician, number 
of laboratory tests per consultation, and proportion of consultations lasting more than 
20 minutes. This finding suggests that regulation of patient fees and payments from 
the National Insurance Administration can be an effective means of controlling 
physicians’ income and government expenditure on primary physician services. 
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